Chapter 1
Adaptive traffic modelling for network anomaly detection

Vassilios C. Moussas

Abstract
With the rapid expansion of computer networks, security has become a crucial issue, either for small home networks or large corporate intranets. A standard way to detect illegitimate use of a network is through traffic monitoring. Consistent modelling of typical network activity can help separate the normal use of the network from an intruder activity or an unusual user activity. In this work an adaptive traffic modelling and estimation method for detecting network unusual activity, network anomaly or intrusion is presented. The proposed method uses simple and widely collected sets of traffic data, such as, bandwidth utilization. The advantage of the method is that it builds the traffic patterns using data found easily by polling a network node MIB. The method was tested using real traffic data from various network segments in our university campus. The method performed equally well either off-line or in real-time, running at a fraction of the smallest sampling interval set by the network monitoring programs. The implemented adaptive multi-model partitioning algorithm was able to identify successfully all typical or unusual activities contained in the test datasets.

Key words: Traffic modelling, Fault detection, Anomaly detection, Network Simulation, Adaptive estimation, Forecasting, SARIMA models, Nonlinear time series, State-Space models, Kalman filter, Multi-Model.

1.1 Introduction

In order to separate the normal use of a network from an intruder activity or an unusual user activity, consistent models of typical network activity or abuse are
required. Traffic monitoring and modelling is also essential in order to determine the network’s current state (normal or faulty) and also to predict its future trends [9].

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are being designed to protect such critical networked systems. There are two major approaches in intrusion detection: anomaly detection and misuse detection. Misuse detection is first recording and modeling specific patterns of intrusions, and then, monitoring and reporting if any matches are found. Anomaly detection, on the other hand, first records and models the normal behavior of the network, and then, detects any variations from the normal model in the observed data. The main advantage with anomaly intrusion is that it can detect new forms of attacks or network misuse, as they will probably deviate from any other normal behavior [5].

Anomaly detection systems apply various methods to model the normal behavior of the network. Some systems utilize artificial neural networks (ANN) [4] and self-organizing maps (SOM) [26]. The NN is fed initially by normal traffic to learn the normal conditions and then by the observed traffic to detect anomalies. Other systems collect statistics from certain system parameters into a profile, and they construct a distance vector for the observed traffic and the specified profile [25].

Most methods of intrusion detection are based on hand-coded rule sets or predicting commands on-line, they are laborious to build, and, they require a very large amount of special traffic data (detailed static logs, protocols, ports, connections, etc.) provided by hubs, routers, firewalls, hosts, and network sniffers. In addition, most of these algorithms require that the data used for training is purely normal and does not contain any attacks. The process of manually cleaning the data is quite time consuming and a large set of clean data can be very expensive, although some algorithms may tolerate mixed data [6].

1.1.1 Network monitoring

Traffic monitoring, traffic prediction and anomaly detection are crucial for today’s networks and they all play a significant role when designing a network or network upgrades [7, 11, 30].

When planning or designing a network, good forecasts of the network traffic workload are required. Early detection of a traffic anomaly is also crucial when controlling or managing LAN, MAN and WAN networks. Both, forecasts and detections can be calculated using various models of the network behaviour in combination with a corresponding simulation or identification technique [17, 21, 27].

Traditionally, network fault management emphasizes the detection and the processing of network and element failures in the form of alarms. Regarding network fault detection, the past years have witnessed much progress in anomaly detection in Ethernet segments [14], anomaly and performance change detection in small networks, and, proactive anomaly detection of network and service faults [8]. In the last case, proactive anomaly detection can infer the presence of non-monitored failures
Adaptive traffic modelling for network anomaly detection

(i.e., no MIB nor trap information access) from the monitored performance data of the networks. In addition to the on-line anomaly detection, the same models can also be applied either for network simulation or prediction.

1.1.2 Traffic modelling detail levels

Network model selection depends mainly on the applied technique and the available network data. There are several types of data available to collect, when studying a network. Almost any traffic characteristic may be measured and logged i.e., bit or packet rate, packet size, protocols, ports, connections, addresses, server load, applications, etc. Routers, firewalls, servers or managers (servers with agents) can all be used for this task.

Each modelling method represents the behaviour of the network at a different level of detail. More abstract models, based only on the overall line utilization, are less precise, but they are also very fast and less demanding. On the other hand, more detailed models, represent the exact packet exchange procedure in a network, but they are very slow and resource demanding. Measuring and archiving all traffic data at full detail for potential future use is not a regular procedure. Based on the level of traffic detail observed, the traffic models may be divided in two main groups:

More Abstract Traffic Models: Usually most networks log only the load of their lines and the utilization of some critical resources, while, a more detailed monitoring is used only when a resource requires specific attention. On almost any network, traffic rate and utilization are the only data collections that are always available and with long history records. These data are easily taken from the router MIB or from a server logs and they can be used to create global or aggregate traffic models [15, 16, 31].

More Detailed Traffic Models: When more detailed models of the network behaviour are needed, special traffic data provided by agents, switches, routers, firewalls, hosts, or network sniffers must be used. Moreover, when modelling user behaviour, other types of data such as transaction duration, user habits, skills or position, may be required [13, 22].

1.2 Traffic modelling categories and uses

In [18] an effort to classify the traffic models by their detailed or abstract view of the inherent network mechanism, resulted to three (3) major model categories:

1. Overall Utilization modelling category (OU): The most abstract models that observe only the overall utilization of network lines or components.

OU models describe the network load of each segment or component in packets per time unit (pps) or bytes per time unit. They may also use any other character-
istic (e.g. processor load) found in the MIB of a network component and captured by a monitoring application. The required data are easily collected from the router interface and stored in a dedicated machine. This is done on-line without delays and it does not require any special HW or SW capabilities. In addition, OU models have a large database of past records waiting to be used for model training. This happens just because most networks use these sets of data for every day monitoring and they keep them for reference or for their network load history. OU models take also into account the periodic nature of the network utilization, its stochastic properties, and any known anomalies observed in the past. These abstract models require much less processing time and can be applied on-line on any machine, either for simulation and prediction or for anomaly detection. Due to their abstract nature, these models offer an on-line first warning for any network anomaly, even if they cannot be more precise about the type or cause of the problem.

2. **Packet Pattern modelling category (PP):** The most detailed models that describe the network traffic at packet level in full detail. PP models attempt to describe the network traffic at packet or signalling level. Each action is analysed in full detail and the exact packet type, size and exchange procedure is defined. PP models may detect suspicious packets or other port pattern anomalies from e.g., their TCP flag combinations, timing, or matching to a certain pattern library. Typical examples in this category are the packet spoofing attacks, such as, SYN-flood, Smurf, TCP spoofing, Bounce Scan, Zombie control, etc. Most IDS or anomaly detection systems in this category belong in the ‘signature analysis’ class where, detailed descriptions of known attacks or anomalies are encoded e.g., in the form of rules and stored for comparison and reference.

Data at this level are usually collected by a packet capturing tool. Packet capturing is a very intensive and hardware demanding task. The network adapter is usually working in promiscuous mode capturing all network traffic and storing it in long files for further analysis. Packet analysis and statistics is then done off-line by other programs. Statistics and/or patterns for typical packets are often stored in a pattern library and subsequently used to detect anomalies in the same type of traffic.

Network traffic analysis or simulation using very detailed models can be slow and resource demanding. The processed or simulated time is often a small fraction of the physical time and therefore it is difficult to apply the models on-line for long periods.

PP models can identify an anomaly with high accuracy. They are able to distinguish between different types of network misuse or attacks and trigger the correct reaction. Due to their complexity, they are usually activated for detailed detection after a global anomaly detection by another less detailed model (TP or OU).

3. **Task Pattern modelling category (TP):** Less detailed models that distinguish the various categories of network traffic e.g., by application, protocol or user behaviour.
TP models attempt to describe the network traffic per service, protocol, or user task. Each type of traffic is characterised mainly by the protocol used, the originating service, the network path between client and server and the task objective or duration. Most IDS or anomaly detection systems in this category belong in the 'statistical systems' class that intend to 'learn' normal behaviour from the data, and then issue alerts for suspected anomalies.

Data for this category of models are provided by the various application logs, the network component MIBs, the firewall logs, or by specialized applications running on a host or server, possibly with agents on other machines. The network traffic data collected report, usually, the total number of packets or bytes per time unit, the average size, or statistics on the size, the frequency, headers, origin and other characteristics of the observed messages.

In order to detect network anomalies, a library of normal or expected behaviour is created and all newer arrivals are compared to the stored patterns and classified accordingly. This is repeated for any application under consideration and for any type of service or protocol.

Although it is possible to observe and analyse on line at this level of network traffic, it is still impossible to store long records in such detail due to space and time limitations. Therefore, it is difficult to find sufficient past records in order to create adequate models for any type of traffic, unless there has been a specific preparation for such methods.

4. **Combined PP and TP models**: It is not a model category itself but it is mentioned here as, many applications used for network simulation combine both PP and TP models.

Applications used for network simulation may combine PP and TP models. The network load is modelled as a set of tasks (TC) producing packets that travel across lines and nodes according to the network protocols used (PP). Such applications require a model for each node of the network and a model for each application served by the network. They superimpose all generated traffic (user tasks, applications, etc.) on the underlying network model (lines, nodes, servers, etc.), and take into account the network type properties and limitations (congestion, retransmissions, etc.) thus producing a simulated network response. The accuracy of these simulations depends on the accuracy of the network component models and application models introduced by the user.

Combined PP-TP models have higher computational requirements, both in processing power and storage and they are running much slower than the real world events. The simulated time is only a fraction of the real time passed and often a computer cluster is required just to keep real time below 1000x the simulation physical time. Consequently, these combined models, although they are a good technique for simulation and prediction, they are not always suitable for on-line detection of network anomalies.

Each of the above model categories (OU, PP and TP) represents the network behaviour from a different point of view, and requires different types of network data. The selection of a model category should be based on the available resources,
the available data sets and the desired results of the modelling procedure i.e., the use case where it is applied.

In this work we distinguish two major uses where the above models can be applied: Simulation and Prediction, or, Fault and Anomaly Detection. In both cases, the models need some training from past data and known cases. The final model selection depends on the desired outcome, the available infrastructure, the knowledge base of past records, and the desired level of detail. Each of the three categories (OU, PP and TP) may offer different pros and cons per use case:

- **Using the traffic models for simulation and prediction:** For simulation and prediction purposes all three model categories can be applied, provided that enough past data are available for training. More precisely:
  - OU models require only the default data stored in component MIBs. These data are available on almost any network. If there is no other monitoring tool applied on a network, the OU model is the only option. The almost certain existence of past utilization data, guaranties that the training of the model will be mostly accurate. An OU model should also be used when general utilization forecasts are required, using periodic models that incorporate current trends and future uncertainties.
  - PP models require detailed records from packet capturing applications and precise knowledge of the packet exchange procedures of the network. In addition, there must be plenty of real time available in order to run the simulations for a sufficient simulated time. If real time is of essence, a faster and less detailed model should be considered.
  - TP models require data from different sources such as server application logs, manager-agent monitoring tools and component MIBs. Statistical analysis of the past data provides the TP models with probabilistic information and distributions that will used during data regeneration and prediction. The availability of these data will eventually define the exact form and the applicability of the model.

- **Using the traffic models for fault or anomaly detection:** For fault or anomaly detection purposes all three model categories can also be applied, provided that the required past and present data are available. More precisely:
  - OU models can be applied easily on any network and they are reporting the presence of a fault or anomaly rather than its nature or source. They are abstract but also much faster and less demanding. Their main advantage is that there is always a past utilization record available to train them, and, in combination with a good identification technique they perform quit satisfactorily. OU models combined with Seasonal ARMA or Multi-model techniques can detect successfully known (trained) situations and also isolate any other detected faults or anomalies.
  - PP models are not quite suitable for 24/7 all purpose anomaly detection. They should be used at a second stage for finer more detailed identification of an
attack or a fault cause. These models are usually applied off line to post-process and analyse the collected data. PP models can be used on-line only when they focus to a narrow subset of the overall traffic and usually for a limited time period.

- TP models can be more suitable than PP models for anomaly or fault detection. When past data are available, TP models with the necessary statistical information for the various applications or transactions may be calculated and stored. Libraries or knowledge bases with such models are then used by the detection application as a reference for the classification of the incoming traffic. This category includes a wide range of models including, rule models, statistical models, lookup tables, neural networks, stochastic and multiple-models, etc. TP detection models may vary from more detailed (closer to PP) to less detailed (closer to OU). When detail is increased, speed and ease of implementation is decreased, and vice-versa.

1.3 Network traffic model identification

In this section, the components of the adaptive traffic modelling and estimation method, for network unusual activity and intrusion detection, are presented. The first aim of the proposed method is to use very common, simple and widely found traffic datasets, such as overall bandwidth utilization data (OU). Bandwidth use is the most common set of network traffic data; almost all network administrators monitor periodically and store the bandwidth utilization for their servers, routers, LAN users, or network connections. The second aim of the proposed method is to take advantage of the time-series techniques [3] that have been applied already successfully in almost any research field, such as: economy, signal processing, computer networks [15, 32], wireless communication [27], BW management [24], or even, structural safety [29], and, today it is a well established tool. It is also clear that the time-series models perform satisfactorily under conditions or circumstances similar to those of the training data set. In our case this leads to the creation of many different models, each one fitting best a different pattern of traffic flow [28]. Normal traffic, congestion, weekdays, weekends, works or accidents, they all require different modeling schemes. As a result, there are many models available to describe the various status of traffic flow, and we could have better forecasting results if we are able to combine them optimally under one global method.

The proposed method is using past traffic data to learn and model (by ARMA, State-Space, or other models) the normal or typical periodic behaviour of a network connection. In addition, any known faulty, abuse or anomaly state can be modelled and stored in this continuously updated model base.

An adaptive identification mechanism based on a powerful Multi-Model Partitioning Algorithm, (MMPA), proposed by Lainiotis [12] known for its stability and well established in identification and modelling, is then applying the collected OU data to the candidate traffic models. If the traffic pattern does not match an expected
behaviour of the network connection, an anomaly is detected and furthermore, if the traffic pattern matches a known anomaly case, the type of anomaly can be identified.

In the following sections, we first present some ARMA and State-Space models of network traffic that can be used by MMPA, then we present the multi-model partitioning algorithm (MMPA), and finally, we present detection results from MMPA, using real datasets collected at the campus network of the Tech. Educ. Inst. (TEI) of Athens.

![Image](image.png)

**Fig. 1.1** Average utilization data from the TEI of Athens campus network (weekly data): a) the campus Internet connection, b) a educational premises backbone, c) an administration offices VLAN, d) the remote users connections.

### 1.3.1 S-ARIMA traffic modelling

As shown in figure 1.1, the recorded OU network traffic and bandwidth utilization demonstrate a remarkable periodicity, daily, weekly and also yearly. One method to model such “seasonal” behavior is to use a set of Seasonal ARIMA (SARIMA) time-series models. In an earlier work [16], the network bandwidth utilization of the TEI of Athens campus network was successfully modelled using such SARIMA models. In this contribution the same method is applied in order to model the periodic behaviour observed in the daily and weekly repeated OU patterns.

The principle underlying this methodology is that traffic data occur in a form of a time series where observations are dependent. This dependency is not necessarily limited to one step (Markov assumption) but it can extend to many steps in the past of the series. Thus in general the current value $X_t$ (= network traffic at time $t$) of
the process \(X\) can be expressed as a finite linear aggregate of previous values of the process and the present and previous values of a random input \(u\), i.e. [3]:

\[
X_t = \phi_1 X_{t-1} + \phi_2 X_{t-2} + \cdots + \phi_p X_{t-p} + u_t - \theta_1 u_{t-1} - \theta_2 u_{t-2} - \cdots - \theta_q u_{t-q} \quad (1.1)
\]

In equation 1.1, \(X_t\) and \(u_t\) represent respectively the traffic volume and the random input at equally spaced time intervals \((t, t-1, t-2, \ldots)\). The random input \(u\) constitutes a white noise stochastic process, whose distribution is assumed to be Gaussian with zero mean and standard deviation \(\sigma_u\).

Equation 1.1 can be economically rewritten as 1.4 by defining the autoregressive (AR) operator of order \(p\) and the moving-average (MA) operator of order \(q\) by equation 1.2 and equation 1.3 respectively:

\[
\phi_p(B) = 1 - \phi_1 B - \phi_2 B^2 - \cdots - \phi_p B^p \quad (1.2)
\]

\[
\vartheta_q(B) = 1 - \theta_1 B - \theta_2 B^2 - \cdots - \theta_q B^q \quad (1.3)
\]

\[
\phi_p(B) X_t = \vartheta_q(B) u_t \quad (1.4)
\]

where, \(B\) stands for the backward shift operator defined as \(B X_t = X_{t-1}\) and \(\nabla X_t = X_t - X_{t-1}\) and thus, \(\nabla = 1 - B\), \(\nabla^d = (1 - B)^d\) and \(\nabla^D = (1 - B)^D\).

The Auto-Regressive Moving-Average model (ARMA) as formulated above is limited to modelling phenomena exhibiting stationarity. Clearly this is not the case for the network traffic data of figure 1.1. It is possible though that the processes still possess homogeneity of some kind. It is usually the case that the \(d\)th difference of the original time series exhibits stationary characteristics. The previous ARMA model could then be applied to the new stationary process \(\nabla X\) and equation 1.4 will correspondingly read

\[
\phi_p(B^d) X_t = \vartheta_q(B^d) u_t \quad (1.5)
\]

This equation represents the general model used in this work. Clearly, it can describe stationary \((d = 0)\) or non-stationary \((d \neq 0)\), purely autoregressive \((q = 0)\) or purely moving-average \((p = 0)\) processes. It is called Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving-Average (ARIMA) process of order \((p, d, q)\). It employs \(p + q + 1\) unknown parameters \(\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_p; \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_q; u\), which will have to be estimated from the data.

Starting from ARIMA model of equation 1.5 it can be deducted [3] that a seasonal series can be mathematically represented by the general multiplicative model often called Seasonal ARIMA or SARIMA of order \((p, d, q) \times (P, D, Q)_s\):

\[
\phi_p(B^d) \Phi_p(B^s)^d \nabla^d X_t = \vartheta_q(B^d) \Theta_q(B^s)^d u_t \quad (1.6)
\]

The general scheme for determining these traffic models includes three phases, which are:
1. Model identification, where the values of the model order parameters $p, d, q, P, D, Q$ and $s$ are defined.
2. Parameter estimation, where all $\phi$ and $\theta$ coefficients in $\phi_p, \Phi_P, \theta_q, \Theta_Q$ are determined in some optimal way, and,
3. Diagnostic checking for verifying the model’s performance over the collected data.

As is stated however in [3], there is no uniqueness in the ARIMA models for a particular physical problem. In the selection procedure, among potentially good candidates one is aided by certain criteria. Although more advanced methods for model selection have been proposed [10, 23], the most common and classic criteria remain the Akaikes Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartzs Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC or BIC) [1, 3]. Proper choice of the parameters at phase 1 calls for a minimization of the AIC and SBC.

By analysing our campus OU traffic data from different subnets and VLANs, recorded hourly for several months, we verified the periodicity of the data. As shown in figure 1.2 by taking the autocorrelation function (ACF), two major seasonal components were identified, a daily and a weekly one, every 24 hours and 168 hours respectively. In this weekly repeated pattern of OU, the observed daily network behavior is then classified in two categories: a) the OU traffic during normal working days, and b) the OU traffic during weekends and holidays.

After several tests on datasets collected at various time intervals (5-30min), a common S-ARIMA model was identified that can satisfy both categories. Provided that its past period data belong to the same category with the forecasting period, the Seasonal ARIMA $(1,1,1)x(0,1,1)_{48}$ model predicts satisfactorily the future network traffic, as shown in figure 1.3.
Fig. 1.3 Daily traffic prediction using the Seasonal ARIMA (1,1)x(0,1,1)₄₈ model: (Left) working day traffic, (Right) weekend or holiday traffic. Prediction starts at step 145. The previous period (steps 97 to 144) is replaced by the average of all past periods (days) of the same type (weekends or working days).

Equation 1.7 represents the above SARIMA model mathematically. The autoregressive (AR) and moving-average (MA) parameters of the model are: \( \phi_1 = 0.413027 \), \( \theta_1 = 0.942437 \), \( \Theta_1 = 0.959323 \).

\[
\phi(B)\nabla_1 \nabla_48 X_k = \theta(B)\Theta\left( B^{48} \right) u_k
\]

where, \( \phi(B) = 1 - \phi_1 B \), \( \theta(B) = 1 - \theta_1 B \), \( \Theta(B^{48}) = 1 - \Theta_1 B^{48} \), and the analytic expression for model equation 1.7 will be:

\[
X_k - (1 + \phi_1)X_{k-1} + \phi_1 X_{k-2} - X_{k-48} + (1 + \phi_1)X_{k-49} - \phi_1 X_{k-50} = u_k - \theta_1 u_{k-1} - \Theta_1 u_{k-48} + \theta_1 \Theta_1 u_{k-49}
\]

1.3.2 State-Space traffic modelling

The State-Space models are required in order to be compatible with the Multi-Model Partitioning Algorithm (MMPA) and its sub-filters, such as, the Kalman or Extended Kalman algorithms. Many physical processes can be described using a state space model. In addition, ARMA processes can be rewritten as State-Space process. A typical linear State-Space model is described by the following set of equations:

\[
x_{k+1} = F \cdot x_k + G \cdot w_k,
\]

\[
z_k = H \cdot x_k + v_k
\]
In the more general case of a non-linear model with parametric uncertainty the state equations become:

\[
x_{k+1} = f[k, x_k, n] + g[k, x_k] \cdot w_k,
\]

\[
z_k = h[k, x_k, n] + v_k
\]

(1.10)

In order to make the time-series traffic models compatible to the notation of the MMPA and Kalman algorithms [2], model 1.8 must be rewritten in a State-Space format. Based on the innovations representation of an ARMA process, any ARMA model of the type:

\[
z_k + a_1 z_{k-1} + \cdots + a_n z_{k-n} = b_0 u_k + \cdots + b_m u_{k-m},
\]

can be written in the following linear State-Space form [2]:

\[
x_{k+1} = \begin{bmatrix}
-a_1 & I & \cdots & 0 \\
-a_2 & & \cdots & I \\
\vdots & & \ddots & \vdots \\
-a_{n-1} & 0 & \cdots & I \\
-a_n & 0 & \cdots & 0
\end{bmatrix} x_k \\
\begin{bmatrix}
 b_1 - a_1 b_0 \\
 b_2 - a_2 b_0 \\
 \vdots \\
 b_m - a_m b_0
\end{bmatrix} u_k,
\]

(1.11)

\[
z_k = \begin{bmatrix}
 I & 0 & \cdots & 0
\end{bmatrix} x_k + b_0 u_k
\]

By substituting the model coefficients of equation 1.8 to the State-Space representation 1.11 the SARIMA model can be directly implemented by a typical State-Space algorithm such as the Kalman filter. The corresponding (non-zero) coefficients are:

\[
a_0 = 1, \quad a_1 = -(1 + \phi_1), \quad a_2 = \phi_1, \\
a_{48} = -1, \quad a_{49} = (1 + \phi_1), \quad a_{50} = -\phi_1 \quad \text{(1.12)}
\]

In addition, State-Space models can also be used to describe any non-periodic OU traffic patterns. There are numerous traffic conditions, such as line failures or network misuse, that can not be modelled by an ARMA process. These events are not periodic, they occur at random instances and therefore, the above seasonal models are not very helpful.

Typical cases can be: a sudden rise (peak) in traffic (due of an attack or misuse), a zero traffic rate (due to a failure), a very constant (usually high) traffic (due to congestion or a DoS attack), etc. Below we present the State-Space equations corresponding to each of these unusual cases:

Traffic Rise x10:
\[
z_k = x_k + v_k, \quad x_{k+1} = 10 \cdot x_k
\]

Line Failure:
\[
z_k = x_k + v_k, \quad x_{k+1} = x_k, \quad (x_0 = 0)
\]

Line Saturation:
\[
z_k = x_k + v_k, \quad x_{k+1} = x_k, \quad (x_0 = \text{maxBW})
\]

(1.13)

The traffic models described above (ARIMA or State-Space) are the adaptive method’s candidates that will be matched, each one to a Kalman filter, and subse-
1 Adaptive traffic modelling for network anomaly detection

sequently, introduced to the MMPA algorithm in order to detect adaptively the correct model of network utilization. A sample containing four various modelled traffic sequences is shown in figure 1.4.

![Sample Traffic Patterns](image)

Fig. 1.4 Four samples of traffic sequences representing different traffic conditions and modelled using equations 1.11 and 1.13.

### 1.3.3 The multi-model partitioning algorithm (MMPA)

The adaptive method applied here is based on the Multi-Model Partitioning Algorithm originally presented by D. G. Lainiotis [2, 12]. MMPA consists of a parallel bank of $N$ sub-filters (i.e., Kalman, Extended Kalman, etc.), operating concurrently on the measurements (figure 1.5).

Each sub-filter is tuned to a State-Space modelling a different traffic behavior and described by equations 1.11 and 1.13. At time step $k$, first, each filter processes the measurement $z_k$ and produces a state estimate $x(k/k; n)$ of of the state $x_k$, conditioned on the hypothesis that the corresponding model is the correct one, and then, the MMPA uses the output of all elemental filters to select the most likely model as the one that maximizes the a-posteriori probability density $p(n/k)$. This density can be calculated recursively by equation 1.14 [12]:

$$p(n/k) = \frac{L(k/k; n)}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} L(k/k; i)p(i/k - 1)}$$

where:

$$L(k/k; n) = |P_{x}(k/k - 1; n)|^{-\frac{1}{2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \|z(k/k - 1; n)\|^2 P_{z}^{-1}(k/k - 1; n)}$$

(1.14)

(1.15)
and where $\hat{z}(k/k-1; n)$ and $P_\hat{z}(k/k-1; n)$ are the conditional innovations and corresponding covariance matrices produced by the Kalman filter corresponding to model $n$. The overall MMPA state estimation is then calculated by:

$$\hat{x}(k) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \hat{x}(k/k; n) p(n/k) \quad (1.16)$$

and

$$P(k/k) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ P(k/k; n) + ||\hat{x}(k/k) - \hat{x}(k/k; n)||^2 \right] p(n/k) \quad (1.17)$$

At each iteration, the MMPA algorithm identifies the model that corresponds to the maximum a posteriori probability as the correct one. This probability tends (asymptotically) to one, while the remaining probabilities tend to zero. If the model changes, the algorithm senses the variation and increases the corresponding a posteriori probability, while decreasing the remaining ones. Thus the algorithm is adaptive in the sense of being able to track model changes in real time. This procedure incorporates the algorithm’s intelligence.

The above presented multi-model partitioning algorithm (MMPA) possess several interesting properties:

- Its structure is a natural parallel distributed processing architecture and hence it is more suitable to current computers clusters.
- By breaking a large and/or non-linear model to smaller sub-cases the algorithm has a much smaller dimensionality and hence much less architectural complexity.
- Although computationally intensive, it works faster due to parallelism and hence it is much more appropriate for real-time applications.
- It is more robust than any single filter as it is capable to isolate any diverging sub-filter. Numerous applications and simulations in the literature also show this.
- The algorithm is well structured and modular and it is easy to implement and modify on any standard programming environment (e.g. MATLAB).
1.4 Detection results using real traffic data

In order to test the efficiency of the MMPA method, we use real data from the TEI of Athens campus network. The test dataset was created from real cases and, as shown in figure 1.6, the dataset represents a week of traffic i.e. five working days and a weekend.

Our test traffic data were collected from our router’s standard MIB and/or the server’s typical logs. In order to avoid any device or system specific problem the data were taken via a monitoring tool. The earlier Multi Router Traffic Grapher (MRTG) tool [19] and its current version Round Robin Database Tool (RRDtool) [20] have been applied for over a decade in our campus network for continuous monitoring and utilization data collection. These tools are computationally efficient, widely applied, and easy to implement software packages for collecting and/or monitoring utilization data from any router or server MIB. They produce standard log files with current and past data that can be downloaded and saved by any browser or simple GET commands. Our adaptive method first reads these standard log files and then performs the model identification steps. This is done repeatedly every 5 min which is the default MIB sampling period or even faster, provided that the network responses arrive in time.

Fig. 1.6 Test dataset (upper) for one week (S-M-T-W-T-F-S) of data containing peaks and failures, and, (lower) the MMPA’s successful detection of the pattern changes and traffic anomalies in the test dataset.

In order to test the MMPA performance, we introduced in our dataset link failures and sudden high traffic peaks. The MMPA was equipped with four (4) Kalman sub-
The aim of MMPA is to select the correct model \( n \) among the \( N \) various "candidates". By identifying the correct model, MMPA detects the current type of traffic and, consequently, if this matches the normal behaviour or a potential traffic anomaly. In the our example the elemental filters are based on the family of models described by equations 1.11-1.13.

The a posteriori probability density \( p(n/k) \) of each model is used to identify the type of the observed traffic. The model that maximizes this quantity is selected. If the selected model is also the correct day pattern of the current day, then we have normal traffic conditions; otherwise, an anomaly is detected.

As shown in figure 1.6, the proposed method detects successfully both, the changes from weekend to working days and vice-versa. On Saturday at 8:00 offices remain closed and the traffic pattern changes and matches the weekend pattern. The MMPA detects the difference and the probability of the weekend model (dashed line) is increased versus 1, while the probability of the working day model (dotted line) falls versus 0. After the weekend, on Monday at 8:00 employees start using the network and the usage pattern changes back and matches the working day model. The method detects equally well, traffic peaks (misuse) and traffic zeros (i.e. link failures).

In addition to the successful detection, the adaptive algorithm also completes the detection in a matter of seconds, thus, permitting us to increase the sampling rate of the data collection and the on-line response of the system. The default sampling rate to collect measurements from the routers’ MIB is usually set to 5 minutes. The proposed method is so fast that does not pose any restrictions on the sampling rate. On the contrary it is the network nodes that may not be able to reply in time if an increased sampling rate is used.

Further work that is currently in progress, based on the above results, investigates: monitoring and modelling of other MIB quantities related to network faults or misuse, further increase of the sampling rate to obtain faster reaction times, modelling of end-user behaviour, and, enriching the MMPA model bank with of more patterns of unusual activities or network problems.

Note that, although in the presented work the elemental Kalman filters were tuned to the State-Space models describing the various traffic patterns, as required by the Kalman filter structure, this is not obligatory for the MMPA. MMPA can use any type of sub-filter and its corresponding model (e.g. Artificial Neural Network), provided that it is accompanied by the corresponding estimator/predictor component, that will interface the algorithm and handle the sub-filter inputs and results.

1.5 Conclusions

In this paper an adaptive multi-model method is presented for modelling network traffic flow and detecting any network unusual activity or misuse. The method is
based on standard bandwidth utilization data found in the MIB and does not require specialised data collection tools. The proposed method uses the past traffic data to model all normal periodic behaviours of a network connection. ARMA and State-Space models are mainly used for traffic pattern modelling without excluding other models such as neural nets. An adaptive Multi-Model Partitioning Algorithm processes the collected traffic data through a set of filters, each matching a traffic pattern. The method was tested using real datasets from the campus network and it detected correctly all pattern changes, failures or unusual activities contained in the test datasets. The method is also very fast and it can perform equally well in real-time even in a fraction of the default 5 min sampling interval that was used to poll the devices and the campus network segments.

References


